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Abstract

This thesis studies the fifth-century christological controversy surrounding Cyril of
Alexandria (c. 378-444) and Nestorius of Constantinople (c. 381-451) and their debate around
the person and nature of Jesus Christ, sparked by the theotokos dispute. At the First Council of
Ephesus (431) the christologies of these two bishops and theologians were pitted against each
other, and have since been studied in contrast to one another. The goal of this study is to examine
the christologies of Cyril and Nestorius with the intention to seek reconciliation between the two.
In the Introduction I first orient the reader to the problem and issues at stake, then examine issues
of source material used, and finally I define the sources which formulated the christologies of
Cyril and Nestorius. Chapter One begins the effort to determine the roots each theologian’s
christology by examining the hermeneutical, soteriological, and philosophical underpinnings of
their respective “schools” of Alexandria and Antioch. In Chapter Two I carefully develop the
core christology of Cyril and Nestorius, highlighting their major features and points of
contention. In Chapter Three I begin the move towards reconciling the two diverging
christologies by noting the strengths and weaknesses of each, as well as points of agreement,
finally setting each as the “edges” of an orthodox description of the Incarnation. In the
Conclusion I summarize my thesis statement, while noting areas to improve this study and needs
of further contribution to the field of Cyrilline and Nestorian studies.
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Introduction

In the early months of 429, Nestorius of Constantinople preached a series of sermons
against attributing the title theotokos (“Bearer of God”) to Christ, an act which sparked one of
the greatest controversies in the history of the Church. What began as an effort of simple
terminological correction compounded into an all-out theological battle over the person and
nature of Jesus Christ. To many, the rejection of this term as applied to Christ had unfavored
ecclesial and soteriological consequences. Cyril of Alexandria, bishop of a rival See, took up the
theological mantle against Nestorius. Cyril is known by scholars for being as brilliant as he was
controversial. Controversy and misunderstandings gnawed at him for most of his life, but this did
not stop him from becoming one of the most influential theologians in the fifth century.
The central issue to this christological controversy was the union of the divine and human
natures in Christ at the Incarnation. Error in such a doctrine had many consequences, primarily
soteriological and ecclesial. Both theologians proposed their own understandings of the
Incarnation, but history claimed only one as the victor. The results of this quarrel caused a
serious tear in the fabric of the early Church. The fragility of the controversy must be matched in
the care by which one studies Cyril and Nestorius and their writings. The conflict cannot be
reduced to a mere difference in personalities, or even to the complexities of ecclesial and
imperial politics, though these factors are important.1 This paper seeks to bring careful study to
the christological work of Cyril and Nestorius to determine the causes of their disparity, all the
while seeking to understand their christologies on their own terms.

1

John McGuckin, St. Cyril and the Christological Controversy (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Press, 2004) 21.

1

Most scholarship on Cyril and Nestorius has been comparative, studying their works in
opposition to one another. This study acknowledges those efforts while striving to take a step
away from opposition towards a reconciliation of their christologies. This study will demonstrate
that the discrepancies between Cyril and Nestorius were primarily due to two factors: 1) differing
approaches from their respective schools; and 2) the inability and unwillingness to understand
each other due to a confusion of terms, biblical texts, and metaphors. Many aspects of this great
debate contributed to these factors, but due to the scope of this study not all will be considered,
such as the political and social influences at work, and the ecclesial history surrounding the
legacies of Cyril and Nestorius. While some conclusions will be offered, this thesis primarily
functions as a prolegomenon for future work. Finally, considering those discrepancies, I will
demonstrate how a movement towards a partial reconciliation between Cyril and Nestorius is not
only possible, but also beneficial to the study of christology.
Literature Review
The Christological controversy at Ephesus and leading up to Chalcedon is one of the
most studied topics in Patristic studies, providing rich soil from which scholars continue to
produce contributions to the works of Cyril and Nestorius. Two notable works provide a
foundational study of this history: Pelikan’s first volume of The Christian Tradition and
Grillmeier’s first volume of Christ in Christian Tradition.2 The vast writings on Cyril and
Nestorius depict each in good light and bad, but tradition demonstrates that Cyril won the day at
Ephesus and was later confirmed at Chalcedon, while Nestorius was defeated.3 This trend is

2

Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, vol. 1, The
Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971); Alios Grillmeier, Christ in
Christian Tradition, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).
3

This statement is reductionistic. Realistically there was great controversy which continued long after
Chalcedon. But most historians recognize that Cyril was the victor and Nestorius was not. For more on the
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characteristically seen in the subtitle of Susan Wessel’s Cyril of Alexandria and the Nestorian
Controversy: The Making of a Saint and a Heretic, where she argues this point from a cultural
and historical perspective.4 The purpose of this paper is to converse with the respective
theologians of the fifth century and with modern scholarship, to determine the extent to which
the two disagreed and what caused their disagreements, and to make an attempt towards
reconciling the two positions.
However, two particular research issues have made this study problematic for me. The
first is that while Cyril has produced a large corpus, many of his works have yet to be translated
into English.5 The bulk of Cyril’s primary source material is indebted to P. E. Pusey’s Latin
translations, included in the edited work of E. Schwartz Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum,
while the Greek versions of Cyril’s writings fills 10 volumes (68-77) of J. P. Minge’s Patrologia
Graeca. Nevertheless, Cyril’s major works relating to the Christological controversies (or at least
portions of them) have been translated into English. One of the first efforts came from Richard
Norris in The Christological Controversy, in which he translated some of the works from Cyril
and Nestorius most relevant to the Council of Ephesus, such as Nestorius’ First Sermon against
theotokos and Cyril’s Second Letter to Nestorius. Other most notable efforts would be John A.
McGuckin’s thorough work St. Cyril of Alexandria and the Christological Controversy as well

controversial nature of this debate and its legacy, see the introductions of Richard Norris, The Christological
Controversy (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980); John McGuckin, The Christological Controversy; Susan Wessel,
Cyril of Alexandria and the Nestorian Controversy (Oxford: University Press, 2004).
4

Wessel, Cyril of Alexandria, vii.

5

Since I am a non-specialist in the Latin, Syriac, and Greek languages I am limited in being reliant upon
the English translations.
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as his short translation of On the Unity of Christ.6 Norman Russell, in Cyril of Alexandria,
sought to expand upon McGuckin’s first edition by translating some of Cyril’s other works,
especially portions of his Commentaries on John and Isaiah. A final source for relevant primary
source material comes from John McEnerney’s two-volume set of letters from Cyril and other
parties during the time of christological conflict.7
The second issue involves the lack of primary sources from Nestorius, which has been
problematic as scholars attempt to reconstruct Nestorius’ christology in his own words, rather
than through the writings of Cyril. After his condemnation, many of Nestorius’ writings were
destroyed; however, some works and fragments were safeguarded and hidden by the Syrian
tradition. The only document that truly expresses his early thought around the conflict was his
First Sermon. Several fragments of Nestorius’ works were reassembled by F. Loofs in his
Nestoriana (1905), but it was not until the late 19th century that Nestorius’ The Bazaar of
Heraclides was discovered and translated into French by F. Nau, in Le Livre de Heraclide de
Damas (1910).8 This work was later translated into English by G. R. Driver and L. Hodgson
(1925). It is a shame that Nestorius’ works were so quickly destroyed in the fifth-century, and
that modern scholarship has neglected him until recently. The heretical stigma continues to haunt
Nestorius, despite recent attempts by modern scholars to revitalize and rehabilitate his muddied
name and christology.9

6

For an expanded bibliography on Cyrilline and Antiochene Studies, see McGuckin’s “Study
Bibliographies” in his St. Cyril of Alexandria and the Christological Controversy.
7

John McEnerney, St. Cyril of Alexandria: Letters 1-50 and Letters 51-110, in The Fathers of the Church,
vols. 76 and 77 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1987).
8

“Bazaar” is sometimes rendered as “Book” which is a more accurate translation; F. Nau, Le Livre de
Heraclide de Damas (Paris: Letouzey et ané, 1910).
9

On the modern revival of Nestorian christology, see Carl Braaten, “Modern Interpretations of Nestorius,”
CH 32, no. 3 (1963): 251-267; Richard Kyle, “Nestorius: The Partial Rehabilitation of a Heretic,” JETS 32, no. 1
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Scholars continue the work of meticulously dissecting and reconstructing these fifthcentury christologies. Some works have attempted to rehabilitate the character and work of the
respective early theologians, while others maintain the nuances which irreconcilably exclude the
other. Thomas Weinandy and Daniel Keating have edited a work to demonstrate Cyril as a
broadly erudite theologian beyond his christology.10 Susan Wessels uncovers the political and
rhetorical aspects of the debate in her monograph. In the last few decades, scholars continue to
hone in on singular aspects of the conflict, such as the role of immutability and impassibility, the
use of imagery, or the historical influences of the controversy.
Sources of Christology: Cyril and Nestorius
Three aspects formed the foundation of Cyril and Nestorius’ christologies: 1) the key
biblical texts they chose; 2) the biblical imagery and metaphors that shaped their christology; and
3) the metaphysical terminology they used to describe the Incarnation. Choosing different
starting points in these foundational aspects led to divergence and misunderstandings in their
christologies as Cyril and Nestorius interacted with one another through their competing schools
of Alexandria and Antioch. Modern scholarship has recognized all three of these categories as
aspects of their divergence, but, according to John O’Keefe, most efforts overemphasize the role
that terminology played in the debate. Instead he argues that “the conflict emerges when the
scriptural narrative collides with certain philosophical presuppositions about God.”11
Understanding the foundational texts, metaphors, and terminology is crucial for grasping the

(March 1989): 73-83; Milton Anastos, “Nestorius Was Orthodox,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 16, vol. 16 (1962): 117140; Roberta Chesnut, “Two Prosopa in Nestorius’ Bazaar of Heracleides,” JTS 24, no. 2 (1978): 392-409.
10

Thomas Weinandy and Daniel Keating, The Theology of St. Cyril of Antioch: A Critical Appreciation
(London; New York: T&T Clark, 2003).
11

John O’Keefe, “Impassible Suffering? Divine Passion and Fifth-Century Christology,” TS 58 (1997): 41.
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nuances of each position. It is an easy task to see how Cyril and Nestorius described the
Incarnation differently, but it is increasingly difficult to understand why, and to work towards
reconciliation. In this work I will attempt to incorporate each of the three categories—how they
influenced their respective christologies and how they created conflict that in their day was
irreconcilable.
Scholars identify three texts of Scripture which provide the primary source of Cyril’s
christology: John 1:14, Philippians 2:5-11, and Hebrews 2:14-17.12 In his Commentary on John,
Cyril draws extensively on the phrase “the Word became flesh.” Keating describes Cyril’s
understanding of this passage as “Christ simply is the eternal Word now made flesh for our
sake.”13 Both O’Keefe and Wickham propose that Cyril used the Hebrews passage to expand
upon his argument from John, contending that the divine Logos is the single subject of the
Incarnation.14 However, the text which most powerfully drove Cyril’s christology was the second
chapter of Philippians. Cyril draws upon the language of self-emptying and “taking the form of a
man” in Philippians to demonstrate the soteriological function of the Incarnation “in order to
restore that nature from the effects of Adam’s sin and raise it to participation in God himself.”15
These three texts form the locus of Cyril’s Christology.

12

So O’Keefe, “Impassible Suffering,” 46; Daniel Keating, “Cyril of Alexandria (c. 378-444) and
Nestorius of Constantinople (c. 381-451),” in The Blackwell Companion to the Theologians, ed. Ian S. Markham
(Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 84; Lars Koen, Saving Passion: Incarnational and Soteriological Thought
in Cyril of Alexandria's Commentary on the Gospel According to St. John (Stockholm, Sweden: Uppsala, 1991) 21;
Keating and Koen do not include the Hebrews passage.
13

Keating, “Cyril and Nestorius,” 84.

14

O’Keefe, “Impassible Suffering,” 47; Lionel Wickham, Cyril of Alexandria: Select Letters (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1983) 30.
15

Keating, “Cyril and Nestorius,” 84.
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It is more difficult to find the scriptural locus in Nestorius’ christology.16 The next
chapter will demonstrate that the primary exegete of the Antiochene tradition was Theodore of
Mopsuestia, who greatly influenced Nestorius. While Nestorius also looked to Philippians 2 for
his christology, he gravitated more towards the phrase “form of a servant,” unlike Cyril.
Nestorius relies on this phrase to demonstrate the prosopon of humanity, which will be described
in more detail in Chapter 3, yet his exegesis on that text does more to describe his christology
than his exegetical foundation.17 However, a case can be made that the primary source of
Scripture for Nestorius’ view of the Incarnation was the Epistle to the Hebrews. J. F. BethuneBaker offers a lengthy discussion of one of the few sermons we have from Nestorius,
demonstrating that the Epistle highly influenced his understanding of the Incarnation,
particularly regarding Christ’s role as High Priest.18 In addition, Cyril contends with Nestorius
on multiple occasions in Book Three of his Against Nestorius over the correct interpretations of
Hebrews regarding the Incarnation. A final text of great importance to Nestorius is John 2:19,
which was influential in Nestorius’ biblical imagery for the Incarnation. Overall, a major attempt
to reconstruct Nestorius’ theological locus is needed, if such a task is possible.
Not only did these biblical texts shape their christology, they shaped the biblical
metaphors and images each used to describe their christology. Cyril drew many of his
Incarnational metaphors from OT Scriptures, but his primary metaphor, the soul and body, was

16

This view is also supported by Frederick McLeod, The Image of God in the Antiochene Tradition
(Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1999) 39. McLeod correctly argues that the few
writings we have belonging to Nestorius are apologetic in nature, thus they do not lend themselves to understanding
his exegetical method.
17

See Nestorius’ exposition of Phil. 2 in Nestorius, The Bazaar of Heracleides, 166-67.

18

J. F. Bethune-Baker, Nestorius and His Teaching: A Fresh Examination of the Evidence (Cambridge:
University Press, 1908) 114-115.
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more metaphysical.19 The two best expressions of this metaphor are found in his Second Book on
Against Nestorius and in his Scholia on the Incarnation. In the latter Cyril draws on the work of
Origen, elucidating that soul and body are distinct, but when the soul is joined to the body they
become one and are indistinguishable, yet still different.20 Whatever the body experiences, so
does the soul, and vice versa. This will become quite significant in Cyril’s description of the
hypostatic union, and the communicatio idiomatum. McGuckin summarizes how this metaphor
informs Cyril’s christology: “This discrete existence of a spiritual reality (soul) and a physical
reality (body or flesh) was never compromised in the union of the two that constituted a human
being (an embodied soul), for even in the union the two realities existed discreetly.”21
The primary metaphor Nestorius used to describe the Incarnation was the Temple. He
employs this biblical imagery in his First Sermon again theotokos and in his Second Letter to
Cyril.22 In the former, Nestorius writes, “Am I the only one who calls Christ ‘twofold’? Does he
not call himself both a destroyable temple and God who raises it up? And if it was God who was
destroyed … the Lord would have said, ‘Destroy this God and in three days I will raise him up.’”
Notice that as Nestorius draws from John 2:19 he distinguishes between the Temple and God,
and he will invoke this imagery to argue for the distinguishability of the human and divine
natures while also arguing for their union. He does this by drawing on the imagery of the High
Priest (Logos), who dwells inside of the Temple (human being). Using this imagery, Nestorius

19

Steven McKinion, Words, Imagery, and the Mystery of Christ: A Reconstruction of Cyril of Alexandria’s
Christology, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, vol. 55 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2000) 21-23.
20

Cyril, Scholia on the Incarnation, 8. Found in Pusey, LFC, vol. 47, 192.

21

McGuckin, The Christological Controversy, 199.

22

For the English translations of both, see Norris, The Christological Controversy, 129 and 137.
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often describes the incarnation as an intimate indwelling of the Logos and the body with a moral
agenda, which accentuates their union while also creating a distinction between the two.
Since the two theologians used different metaphors and biblical imagery to describe the
Incarnation, it follows that those metaphors would shape the terms they used to describe the
Incarnation. For now, it is enough to introduce two sets of competing terms used by Cyril and
Nestorius: 1) henosis and synapheia; 2) hypostasis and prosopon.23 To describe the union of the
natures Cyril used the term henosis or “union” of natures, which he borrowed from Gregory
Nazianzen. In contrast, Nestorius favored the term synapheia or “conjunction” of natures. The
difference is best described in how intimate the natures became in creating a new reality. This
first set of terms demonstrate how each nature functioned in relation to one another, and the
second set of terms describe where this union took place metaphysically. Cyril described the
union in terms of a “hypostatic union” or a union of the divine and human hypostases. This term
relates to the concrete reality or underlying essence of thing.24 Again, Nestorius strategically
chose a different term for the location of the union, which he described as a “prosopic union,” or
a union of the divine and human prosopa. This term literally means “face” but for Nestorius it
represented the observable reality and manifestation of a thing (as opposed to the underlying
essence of a thing [hypostasis]). These terminological differences demonstrate the distinctiveness
in the way Cyril and Nestorius thought and spoke about the Incarnation.
The study above describes the internal sources of Cyril and Nestorius’ christologies, but
both clearly stood on the shoulders of their predecessors. Chapter One will demonstrate how
23

For the usage and history of these terms, see PGL: henosis, 479-480; synapheia, 1308-1310; hypostasis,
1454-1460; prosopon, 1186-1189. For a wider readability and the sake of uniformity I have chosen to transliterate
all foreign words into English.
24

McGuckin has an excellent introduction of how these terms were used by Cyril and Nestorius. See
especially The Christological Controversy, 138. Some definitions in this paragraph are his.
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their respective schools contributed to the formation of their christologies. It is also clear these
influences led to several divergences which culminated in the heated controversy at Ephesus and
the aftermath leading to Chalcedon. These specific disagreements will come to light in their
christologies which will be fully developed in Chapter Two. However, after recognizing their
influences and fleshing out their christological tensions, in Chapter Three I hope to demonstrate
an effort towards the reconciliation of their two christologies, rather than simply add to the
scholarly majority that their unity is beyond saving. While a clear divergence will be
demonstrated in this work, as has been seen historically in the study of Cyril and Nestorius, this
thesis also attempts to move beyond their discrepancies and work towards at least a partial
reconciliation of the two theologians. As their theological foundations and own christologies
comes to light, one can begin to see that partial reconciliation is possible, when each theologian
is seen as creating the “edges” of an orthodox understanding of the Incarnation; Nestorius, on his
own terms, representing one edges, and Cyril representing the other.

10

Chapter One
The Polarizing Approaches of Alexandria and Antioch

The discrepancies in the christologies of Cyril and Nestorius are exemplified by the
histories of their respective schools at Alexandria and Antioch.1 The foundational assumptions of
biblical hermeneutics, philosophy, and soteriology influenced the approaches of each school and
in turn shaped the theologians who trained there. These approaches led to a divergence in their
christologies, which came to a head in the works of Cyril and Nestorius, as each school
competed for the favor of Constantinople. One cannot properly understand Cyril and Nestorius
without grasping the ramifications of the influences which their respective schools had on their
work. This chapter will explore a few of the major divergences between the schools and how
these approaches converged in the christological controversies of the fifth-century.
Hermeneutics
Four figures formed the central “school of thought” in Antioch: Andrew Samosata who
was later deemed a heretic, Theodore of Mopsuestia, John of Antioch, and Theodoret of Cyr.2
Nestorius was a contemporary with the latter two and fit well within their thought, but his
infamous exile diminished his influence on the school. The Antiochene approach to biblical
hermeneutics was epitomized by the literal-historical work of Theodore of Mopsuestia, who as
Nestorius’ teacher greatly influenced his christology.3 The influence of Theodore’s hermeneutic

1

The polarity of these two schools has been succinctly described by Roger Olson in The Story of Christian
Theology: Twenty Centuries of Tradition and Reform (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1999), 201-210. See also
R.V. Sellers, Two Ancient Christologies (London: SPCK, 1954).
2

Keating, “Cyril and Nestorius,” 87.

3

Frederick McLeod, “Theodore of Mopsuestia Revisited,” TS 61, no. 3 (Sept 2000): 451.
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(and that of other Antiochenes) should not be overlooked, because his exegetical approach
influenced his christological thought, and vice versa. Rowan Greer, a scholar who has done
notable work in Antiochene and Nestorian studies, concludes that he “repeatedly found his
[Theodore’s] theology proceeding from Scripture and his exegesis motivated by a theological
purpose.”4 As a result Theodore would rely upon Scripture to supply and define his theological
terminology, and this grammatical method was directly applied to his Christology. For example,
McLeod contends: “Theodore prefers to describe Christ’s Incarnation as being a graced
‘indwelling’ of ‘good pleasure’ that justifies Christ being called the true ‘Son of God,’ ‘Lord,’
and ‘image of God.’ Even his favored term for Christ’s person, prosopon is found in the New
Testament.”5 This last observation of the word prosopon will be critical in the christological
debate between Nestorius and Cyril.
Another concrete example of the Antiochene hermeneutic comes from the Gospel of
John.6 R.V. Sellers demonstrates this school’s hermeneutic in Theodore’s reaction against the
Alexandrine treatment of the Greek verb egeneto, which proposed that the Logos “became” flesh
“in the sense that He was ‘changed into’ man.”7 While Cyril surely did not mean a change which
would corrupt God’s immutability, both Theodore and Nestorius pushed against that language
because of what it seemed to imply. However, this example demonstrates the importance of
terminological and exegetical accuracy within the Antiochene tradition. This literal-historical

4

Rowan Greer, Theodore of Mopsuestia: Exegete and Theologian (Westminster: London Faith Press,
1961) 151.
5

Frederick McLeod, “Theodore Revisited,” 451. Cf. especially Luke 9:51-3.

6

For a thorough treatment of Theodore’s christology and understanding of relevant terms through the
Gospel of John, see Frederick McLeod, “The Christology in Theodore of Mopsuestia’s Commentary on the Gospel
of John,” Theological Studies 73 (2012): 115-138.
7

R.V. Sellers, Two Ancient Christologies (London: SPCK, 1954), 144.

12

approach was also true of Nestorius’ who “presented his christological views by carefully
explicating the biblical text” as he wrestled with Cyril.8
Terminological accuracy shaped Nestorius’ reading of Scripture, which he often used to
critique Cyril. Notice Nestorius’ treatment of a key text in Philippians 2:
Paul, however, recounts all at once everything which happened, that the [divine] being
has become incarnate and that the immutability of the incarnate deity is always
maintained after the union. That is why, as he writes, he cries out, “Let this mind be in
you which was also in Christ Jesus, who being in the form of God . . . emptied himself,
taking the form of a slave” [Phil. 2:5-7]. He did not say, “Let this mind be in you which
was in God the Logos, who being in the form of God, took the form of a slave.” Rather,
he takes the term Christ to be an expression which signifies the two natures, and without
risk he applies to him both the style “form of a slave,” which he took, and that of God.
The descriptions are different from each other by reason of the mysterious fact that the
natures are two in number.9
Nestorius observes Paul distinguishing between Christ Jesus as the Incarnate Lord, and God the
Logos as transcendent (purely divine). The difference may seem subtle, but not to Nestorius,
who considers this distinction between Christ and the Logos to be substantial. Thus, the
Incarnation is a union of two natures in Christ, the divine “form of God” and the human “form of
a slave.” In this reading, Christ Jesus represents the product of the union of two natures, divine
and human. To Nestorius, Christ is the subject of the Incarnation, rather than the Logos, as Cyril
would argue. Nestorius demonstrates a literal reading of this passage and believes this technical
distinction to be vital in understanding the Incarnation.
In contrast, the Alexandrine approach to hermeneutics was characteristically allegorical,
primarily influenced by the work of Origen. One example of this approach to biblical

8

Susan Wessel, Cyril of Alexandria and the Nestorian Controversy: The Making of a Saint and a Heretic
(Oxford: University Press, 2004), 236. Wessel also compares the rhetorical styles of Nestorius and Cyril, the latter
being much more pejorative and condescending than the former.
9

Nestorius, First Sermon Against the Theotokos, in Norris, The Christological Controversy, 125-126.
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interpretation, which is found as far back as Irenaeus in the late second century, was their
tendency to discover hidden references to Christ throughout the Old Testament.10 Robert Wilken
describes this tendency in Cyril’s Commentary on Isaiah:
How can one speak of a sumptuous feast for ‘all peoples, a feast of wine’ (25:6) and not
bring to mind the Holy Eucharist? . . . On the basis of a few verses from an oracle of the
prophet Isaiah Cyril establishes a link between the ancient prophecy and the Incarnation
of the divine Logos . . . The way [Cyril] goes about his task is characteristic of early
Christian exegesis.11
Wilken goes on to say that the “subject of Cyril’s exegesis is never simply the text that is before
him, it is always the mystery of Christ.”12 The Antiochene tradition would have grown weary of
this, but for Cyril and the Alexandrine tradition this was a natural approach.
After hearing reports of Nestorius’ First Sermon, Cyril enters into the controversy by
writing his first letter entitled Letter to the Monks of Egypt. Notice Cyril’s treatment of the same
text examined above with Nestorius:
Who is it, then, who is ‘in the form of God’ and who ‘did not count equality with God a
thing to be grasped’? Or in what manner is he ‘emptied out’? Or how did he descend to
humiliation even in the ‘form of a slave’? There are some who divide the One Lord Jesus
Christ into two, that is into a man alongside the Word of God the Father. These people
[Nestorius and companions] maintain that it was the one who came from the holy virgin
who underwent the ‘emptying out’, and in this way they separate him and the Word of
God. But if this is so, let them show how beforehand he could be conceived as being in
the form and equality of the Father, in order that he could then undergo the manner of the
self-emptying so as to establish himself in a state which he did not formerly enjoy? …
How then could he be said to have been ‘emptied out’ if he was a man by nature, and was
then born of a woman like us?13
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Observe that, like Nestorius, the question addressed is who is the subject of the Incarnation.
However, Cyril does not reach the same conclusion as Nestorius from Paul’s use of the title
“Christ.” Instead, he maintains that the Logos is the subject of the Incarnation, for only the
Logos could be “in the form of God,” “empty himself,” or take on a form which he did not
already hold (the “form of a slave”). Cyril read Nestorius as separating man from God by
dividing their natures and placing both with the prosopon of Christ, the subject of the
Incarnation. But for Cyril this separation threatened the integrity of the Incarnation.
It is important to note the lenses by which Nestorius and Cyril read this same text.
Nestorius read Philippians with the intention to preserve the distinction of natures, which is why
he elevates Paul’s language of Christ and compares the two “forms.” By specifying that it was
Christ who took the form of a slave, Nestorius believes he is protecting the immutability of God.
In other words, “Christ as God is unaffected by change.”14 Cyril’s approach is to demonstrate the
power of the union in its ability to bring about salvation through “assuming the form of a
slave.”15 The Logos cannot assume what he already “enjoys.” When the Logos takes the form of
a slave he does so in his very nature, undivided and unchanged. Therefore, their respective
readings of the text are shaped by contrary foundational strategies, and their particular exegetical
methods shaped their christologies. In brief, the allegorical Alexandrine approach, which sought
the spiritual meaning of the text, would eventually clash with the literal-historical-grammatical
approach of the Antiochenes.
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Soteriology
Soteriology has already played a major role in understanding Cyril and Nestorius, both
their christologies and the texts which inform them. This role should not be underestimated,
considering that Cyril and Nestorius are primarily pastors, shepherding their flocks, before
theologians meticulously dissecting Scripture. For both, a correct description of the Incarnation
was a fundamental component of how Christians are saved. Consequently, to pervert that
description, which each accused the other of doing, was to pervert Christ’s salvation of the
believer. Concerning the influence of soteriology on their christologies, Keating argues that their
frame of reference is “strikingly similar,”16 in that they “both rely on the Adam-Christ typology
as the central frame of salvation, and both see the loss of the image of God in Adam as being
crucially restored in Christ.” While they shared the same biblical imagery regarding soteriology,
Keating also notes that they diverge significantly “in how they view the endpoint of the
restoration of our humanity.”17
Both schools held to the understanding of salvation as divinization, or theosis;18 however,
certain subtleties emerged between how salvation took effect through the Incarnation and the
christologies of each school. In general terms, the Antiochene tradition has been given the label
“Word-man” christology, while the Alexandrine tradition carries the label “Word-flesh”
christology.19 Here the difference lies in how salvation is given through the Incarnation. For the
Antiochenes, the Incarnation is necessary due to humankind’s fall, which has corrupted the
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divine image of God in humanity. This corruption is reversed through Christ’s renewal of the
image of God in humanity by joining to that likeness and restoring it by resisting the guilt of sin
which caused its original corruption. Nestorius writes, “He alone sufficed for renewing him who
had originally fallen by the transgression of the observance of the commandments. Otherwise,
He gave Himself for him to observe them because he sufficed not to keep himself without sin…
For this reason He took the likeness of a servant which was without sin in its creation.”20
For Nestorius and the Antiochene tradition, humankind’s renewal and salvation occur
because the divine Logos took on human likeness and through obedience restored that likeness.
This is why, as Olson notes, the Antiochene “God-man” christology is considered to have
emphasized the freedom of Jesus’ human moral agency in his role of salvation. Therefore, their
understanding of theosis relied heavily on the moral-ethical role of Jesus.21 Nestorius says it
more plainly is his First Sermon:
Consequently, Christ assumed the person [prosopon] of the debt-ridden nature and by its
mediation paid back the debt as a son of Adam . . . Because of his disobedience in the
case of a tree, Adam was under sentence of punishment; Christ made up for this debt, too,
“having become obedient” [Phil. 2:8] on a tree . . . He had assumed a person [prosopon]
of the same nature [as ours] whose passions were removed by his passion.”22
This explanation of the soteriological workings of the Incarnation requires a few observations.
First, Christ is again the subject of the Incarnation, and his purpose is to rid the debt of sin
through his “obedience,” highlighting his moral agency. Second, Christ’s primary imagery as a
High Priest who atones for the sins of the people is consistent in Nestorius. Christ “assumes a
person” in a similar way in which a High Priest assumes his place in the Temple. Third, this
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description fits the characteristically Antiochene manner of avoiding any unification of divine
and human natures in a way that would confuse the two. Consequently, scholars such as Sellers
and Keating have deduced that the Antiochenes did argue for a separation of human and divine
natures, and that the human will of Christ was subject and obedient to the divine will of Christ.23
The “Word-flesh” christology of the Alexandrine tradition is best characterized by the
English word “appropriation.” The chief influencer of Alexandrine thought concerning salvation
is Athanasius of Alexandria (328-373 CE), whose teachings on salvation as appropriation are
popularized by the following: “For He [the Logos] was made man that we might be made
God.”24 Athanasius’ apologetic work against the Arians demonstrated that the Logos was
homoousios with the Father and unchanging in nature in the Incarnation. While the Arians
rejected the word “become,” and the Antiochenes would reject the implications of the same in
Cyril’s christology, this description was crucial to the Alexandrine understanding of salvation.25
Jerry McCoy describes the basis for Athanasius’ thought: “The necessary restoration of recreation of man [humanity] required that it be the unchanging Logos himself who comes into our
realm. It was because the first man, Adam, ‘altered’ that sin and death came into the world.” 26
This salvific restoration occurred through the Logos “becoming man.”
For Cyril, the subject of Christ was the Logos— “Christ is God the Word in the flesh
because of our need to be restored and recreated by intimate connection with divine life and
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power.” 27 While Cyril followed the soteriological framework of his Alexandrine forefathers, he
developed his own language of describing the connection between the Incarnation and
divinization. Keating describes Cyril’s perspective on divinization in two senses: broad and
strict.28 The broad sense refers to the Alexandrine comprehensive view that human growth into
the divine image is the goal of salvation. However, in the strict view, “divinization is the
impartation of divine life affected in us through the agency of the indwelling Spirit in baptism,
and through Christ’s life-giving flesh in the Eucharist.”29 This “impartation of divine life” is
made possible through the Incarnation, and specifically through the appropriation of human flesh
and experience by the divine Logos. This impartation is then passed on to humans through their
own participation in the divine life. Cyril describes this in his own reflection on John 14:20
which he describes in his Commentary:
Therefore the only-begotten Word has become a partaker of flesh and blood, that is, he
has become man … [that] he might restore it to his own life and render it through himself
a partaker of God the Father … For this reason we have become “partakers of the divine
nature,” and are reckoned as sons, and so too have in ourselves the Father himself
through the Son.30
These descriptions from Keating and example from Cyril’s hand demonstrate an important
underlying assumption in his soteriology which directly relates to his christology. For Cyril, the
restoration of humanity can only happen by becoming “partakers in the divine image,” and the
opportunity for humans to become partakers happens by the divine Logos becoming flesh and
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providing that connection between human and divine which was severed by Adam, the “first
man.”
Both the Antiochenes and Alexandrines, as represented by Cyril and Nestorius, upheld
that the goal of salvation was the restoration of the “likeness” of humans to that which was given
to them at Creation, the “likeness of God” (Gen 1:26-27). Both agreed that this “likeness” was
restored through the Incarnation of the Logos in Christ. However, both diverged in precisely how
the restoration was actualized. Clinging to his preferred Scriptures and metaphors, Nestorius
argued that the appropriation of humanity leads to restoration through Christ’s obedience, and
subsequently our obedience to Christ. Cyril and the Alexandrines used their own Scriptures and
metaphors to promote the appropriation of humanity by the Logos leading to restoration through
the “impartation of divine life.” While the divergence is a subtle aspect of their christologies, it
does reinforce the competing implications of exactly how the Incarnation of Christ was
actualized. The Antiochene way left more room for a distinction of Christ’s two natures, while
the Alexandrine way necessitated a complete union of the two.
Philosophy and Metaphysical Terminology
Scholars of this christological debate can hardly avoid a discussion on philosophical
presuppositions and the metaphysical terminology used by Nestorius and Cyril. In fact, McLeod,
Keating, McGuckin, and Greer all have demonstrated in their works that the metaphysics of
these competing christologies is the lynchpin their divergence.31 O’Keefe says it well: “the
conflict emerges when the scriptural narrative collides with certain philosophical presuppositions

31

Many of the works by these authors already cited above cannot avoid a discussion on Nestorius’ use of
prosopon or Cyril’s understanding of hypostasis.

20

about what God can and cannot be like.”32 Not only did the schools of Antioch and Alexandria
have different philosophical presuppositions, but their metaphysical and theological jargon was
loaded with their own range of meanings. For example, both schools had different perspectives
on the meanings of words like prosopon and hypostasis, causing confusion and
misunderstanding when the proponents of these schools conversed with each other. While
O’Keefe also warned (in the same article) about the dangers of becoming weighed down by the
evolution of vocabulary, it is necessary to introduce the influence of these metaphysical
categories and terms on the christological controversy.
Theodore of Mopsuestia also championed the Antiochene tradition concerning their
metaphysical presuppositions, and his influence on Nestorius is also seen in his metaphysics.
Most relevant to this study are the terms prosopon and hypostasis. McLeod states that Theodore
had a characteristically Aristotelian perspective on reality which favored the concrete over the
abstract.33 Following the Antiochene tradition of literal interpretation, Theodore “derived his
specific meanings of these terms from a literal interpretation” of how they were used in
Scripture.34 This perspective is manifested in how he viewed the relationship between the
prosopon and hypostasis. He viewed the hypostasis as the concrete reality of a being with a
nature (physis), and the prosopon as the physical manifestation of that hypostasis. Each nature
(physis) had its own reality (hypostasis) and physical manifestation (prosopon) of that reality.
Therefore one can see how Theodore, and also Nestorius, had difficulty with Cyril’s language of
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a “union of hypostases,” because one hypostasis would necessarily absorb the other (in this case
the divine absorbs the human) and this would causes Christ’s nature to be altered in the
Incarnation.35 No matter how Cyril presented it, the Antiochenes could not regard a union of
hypostases to be viable, because it inevitably led to a corruption or confusion of the divine and
human natures in Christ.
The Antiochenes also had a different perspective on the prosopon, a word which Cyril
did not prefer when describing the union in Christ. Theodore described two usages of prosopon
regarding the Incarnation: one common prosopon and two individual prosopa. In general,
“Theodore almost always uses the term to express how a ‘person’ as a particular self performs in
ways appropriate to his or her hypostatic nature or … as … ‘the self-manifestation of an
individual.’”36 The common prosopon in Christ was the visible manifestation of Christ during his
earthly life which demonstrated his hypostatic nature (both divine and human). The two
individual prosopa referred to the two natures of the Word and Jesus that are each free to express
their respective hypostases. The dual understanding of prosopon allowed Theodore to
demonstrate the unity of Christ’s divine and human hypostases while also avoiding their
confusion. McLeod writes, “For Theodore, this meant that the Word can reveal His power and
glory through His visible humanity and Christ’s humanity can also share in the Word’s
prerogatives as Son.”37
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These metaphysical presuppositions, and the meanings they gave to these terms, were
also present in Nestorius’ writings, primarily his Bazaar.38 The importance of these
presuppositions directly apply to how Nestorius and Cyril described the union of Christ. For
instance, Leonard Hodgson argues that Nestorius applied the term hypostasis in the “older
sense,” equivalent to ousia.39 Hodgson argues that Nestorius’ preference for the word prosopon
to describe the union of Christ rests on two principles: 1) That the divine and human ousiai are
two different and antithetical things and must remain distinct in the union. For the two ousiai to
become fused meant that Christ’s ousia would become some new thing; 2) That the union was
necessarily voluntary from both the divine and human parties. Neither could be constrained by
the other.40 This explains his reaction against Cyril’s “hypostatic union” as a confusion of divine
and human ousiai, something that was illogical. So the burden on Nestorius was to describe the
union of Christ in a way that represented a true union, not a mere illusion of one. Whereas Cyril
regarded the term prosopon as the mere external appearance of a thing, for Nestorius the
prosopon was no mere “appearance,” rather it was the real element of a thing. In other words,
Nestorius considered the prosopon to be a necessary component of an ousia, just as Cyril thought
the same of the hypostasis. In this respect, Hodgson suggests that Nestorius did not believe in the
“Two Sons” heresy; rather he believed in a “real metaphysical unity” within the prosopon.41
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Within the Alexandrine tradition, Athanasius laid much of the groundwork upon which
Cyril would later build. Athanasius was highly influenced by a combination of sources which
fused together over time to create the Christian concept of the divine Logos; these influences
were primarily drawn from Philo’s thought, Middle Platonism, and the work of the Apologists,
and had “crystallized” by the time of Athanasius.42 One example of Athanasius’ use of the Logos
concept is drawn from his interpretation of the Philippians 2 passage, in which the Logos
“become flesh.” McCoy notes that for Athanasius the act of “taking flesh” was “so intense that
one can and must say the ‘the Logos is man.’”43 This has implications on the popular
Alexandrine metaphor of the body and soul, representing the divine and human natures of Christ.
McCoy describes Athanasius’ position as “the human soul fulfills the same function in relation to
the human body that the Logos does in relation to the cosmos.”44 In describing the Incarnation,
Athanasius spoke of the divine Logos as replacing the human soul, and thus giving life to the
human body. Grillmeier has noted, “There can be no doubt that the Logos is not merely the
personal subject of Christ’s bodily life, but also the real, physical source of all the actions of his
life … Athanasius, in true Alexandrian fashion, first looks at the relationship of Logos to world,
soul to body, Logos to flesh.”45 Cyril would later expand this body-soul metaphor which
Athanasius employed.
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The Alexandrine philosophical approach was characteristically Platonic, which is
demonstrated in Cyril’s continuation of the body-soul metaphor for the Incarnation as a
demonstration of the relationship between human and divine natures. McCoy describes Cyril’s
use of the body-soul metaphor as Neo-Platonic, in that Cyril argued that the human soul was
impassible and immortal, while the human soul would also “make its own things of the body
while remaining impassible.”46 He would then extend this argument to the divine nature of the
Logos (soul) and the human nature of Jesus (body). Furthermore, McCoy argues that Cyril was
influenced by the commonly-known “substance metaphysics” of his day, in which “the human
and divine natures [were conceived as] two different substances and further caused him to look
to the way substances may be combined.”47 This influenced where Cyril would look to draw his
analogy for the unification of the human and divine natures in Christ.
In turn, Cyril utilized the philosophical toolbelt given him, which influenced the way he
employed relevant metaphysical terms: ousia, physis, hypostasis, and prosopon. While many
scholars have downgraded his philosophical prowess in favor of his theological strength, others
consider him to be philosophically adept.48 One of the most important metaphysical constructs
Cyril utilizes is mia physis (one nature) in his commonly used phrase “one nature of the
Incarnate Word,” which caused considerable conflict with the Antiochenes when he used it in his
description of the Incarnation. For Cyril, the union of the divine and human physes was so
intimate that it formed one physis to that degree that the divine Logos could experience human
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suffering. For the Antiochenes, this union caused a mixing of natures that corrupted the original
natures, causing the divine nature to no longer be immutable. However, Cyril rejected the
accusation of this kind of mixture, and instead argued that a union (henosis) of natures (physis)
in the subsistence (hypostases) of the divine Logos did not constitute a mixture leading to
confusion, but a union leading to a completely shared condition. Sergey Trostyanskiy describes
Cyril’s notion of henosis as both union and distinction: “It is the Word of God who shapes the
humanity by giving it a degree of order and beauty of the divine realm. A radical distinction that
disallows for intermingling of natures, nevertheless, does not prevent natures from being in
communication, allowing human beings to share in the divine life.”49
Summary
At this point we have examined the hermeneutical, soteriological, and metaphysical
factors which influenced both Nestorius and Cyril through their respective traditions. These
factors and presuppositions informed their christologies and how they viewed each other’s
writings in opposition. This chapter follows the diverging influences which existed even before
Nestorius or Cyril began their heated correspondence, and the next chapter will examine how
these divergences manifested themselves in their own christologies. In their own time they could
not see past the disparity, each considering the other to have left out vital components of an
orthodox description of the Incarnation.50
The divergent approaches of the Antiochene and Alexandrine traditions reveal the
fundamental goals of Cyril and Nestorius as they formulated their christologies. For Nestorius, it
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was to protect the distinctness of individual divine and human natures in Christ by describing
their union in a way that excluded any kind of mixture language. For Cyril, it was to protect the
intimate unity of the Word of God and humanity by describing the union in a way that
demonstrated a true unity. Two fundamental Christian principles were at stake, and each
intended to maintain both while inevitably emphasizing one over the other. The first being that
Jesus Christ is one Person, God who became man, and the second being that in Christ are the two
elements of divinity and humanity, remaining real and complete in their union.51 Due to the
influence of their presuppositions, Cyril emphasized the former and Nestorius the latter.
Most studies of Nestorius and Cyril examine their exegesis of Scripture and the
metaphors they are drawn to in view of their metaphysics, but it is important to remember that
while Nestorius and Cyril were capable philosophers, they were primarily pastors who were
concerned about their flock and theologians concerned about the orthodoxy of Christian
tradition. The primary tool in the development of their christologies was their exegesis of
Scripture, which shaped their foundational assumptions about God and humanity. Their
soteriology was the driving force of their christologies. Cyril was especially concerned that
Nestorius’ objections to theotokos was an affront to divine nature of Christ, and thus to the
salvific power of his appropriation of humanity to his divine nature. Finally, they each used
metaphors as expression of their metaphysical assumptions to explain their models of the
Incarnation. The imagery they continually returned to became the vehicle of their metaphysical
description of the Incarnation. The metaphysical terms they used were shaped by the biblical
texts and metaphors they utilized to describe their christologies. Ultimately, these factors
contributed to the formation of Cyril and Nestorius’ christologies, along with their divergences.
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Chapter Two
The Diverging Christologies of Cyril and Nestorius

The Christology of Nestorius
The initial spark of the controversy began with Nestorius and his rejection of the
theological term theotokos, “bearer of God,” as applied to Mary. However, this term had less to
say about Mary than it did about Jesus Christ, in that it was a statement which affirmed the
divine status of Jesus as God.1 The claim of divinity was not what astonished Nestorius, but
rather the poor usage of terminology which the phrase demonstrated. Nestorius argued that it was
inaccurate to call Mary the “bearer of God,” but rather the “bearer of Christ,” or christotokos. It
was Nestorius’ line of thought that “strictly speaking” Mary did not give birth to God, but to the
person Jesus Christ. To him the title christotokos spoke neither against Christ as God or man, and
it demonstrated that Mary neither gave birth to God nor a mere man. It was important to
Nestorius to place great care on the semantic meanings of words. For example, Bethune-Baker
notes that “he repeatedly insists that the terms ‘Christ’, ‘Son’, ‘Lord’ are the proper terms to use
of the incarnate Word” and Nestorius defended himself often with the argument that the
“Evangelists and apostles … never said that ‘God’ was born or died.”2
Unfortunately for Nestorius, his local opponents picked up on his “strictly speaking”
argument and created plaques all over Constantinople with the inscription, “If Mary is not,
strictly speaking, the Mother of God, then her son is not, strictly speaking, God.”3 It could be that
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some of his downfall was caused by the religious and political support around Marian devotion,
which had grown over the past century, and especially his conflict with Empress Pulcheria.4
Nestorius was accused by his opponents for resurrecting the Adoptionist heresy of Paul of
Samosata, in which Jesus was born a mere man with the divine indwelling of the Logos,
maintaining a strict separation of the divine and human natures. However, it is more probable
that Nestorius was seeking to maintain peace in his See by reaching common ground in the
precision of terms. John McGuckin notes that is was the importance of semantics which fueled
much of Nestorius’ Christology, and spark of the theotokos controversy was a prime example of
the “terminological carelessness” which greatly disturbed Nestorius.5
Eventually, Nestorius made the public gesture of attacking the theotokos title in a series
of sermons. His rejection was made for a series of reasons, all of which had strong implications
for his christology. One reason was that the title did not use biblical language, relating back to
his literal hermeneutic, which he believed to be problematic for christological orthodoxy if the
title was not also accompanied with the title “Mother of the Man” (anthropotokos).6 This
maintained the divine and human natures of Christ in way that Nestorius thought was more
appropriate to each. But this leads to the question which is at the heart of this christological
debate: exactly how were the two natures related to the person of Jesus Christ? To Nestorius, this
question also required careful semantics regarding the terms used to describe the union of
natures.
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At the heart of Nestorius’ christology was a desire to maintain the singularity of the
person of Jesus Christ while concurrently maintaining the distinction in his two natures, even
though his opponents alleged otherwise.7 Many would find this to be ironic because Cyril’s most
frequent accusation against Nestorius is that his description of Christ divides the natures, creating
two sons. Consequently, Nestorius is constantly accused of the “Two Sons” christological heresy
of Theodore of Mopsuestia, his mentor. Concerning the natures of Christ, Nestorius upheld the
divinity and humanity of Christ’s natures, but resisted any sort of “mixture” (krasis) language,
which he considered to be Apollinarist.8 In order to give a sound description of the Incarnation,
Nestorius took great care in distinguishing the natures in a way that did not divide the person. He
was especially concerned with Cyril’s language of communicatio idiomatum, or the
communication of attributes between the divine and human natures, which he considered foolish
and confusing. Thus, Nestorius maintained a distinction of natures in the Incarnation, for to say
that “God suffered” was bordering on heresy.
Both the strength and weakness of Nestorius’ description lies in his use of the term
prosopon. McGuckin notes that Nestorius preferred the word prosopon to hypostasis when
describing the reality of Christ in the Incarnation. He writes, “Prosopon, like hypostasis, is
related to the physis [nature] in so far as it is a referent for the concreteness and individuation,
but it differs from the range of meanings attached to physis in being a more specific term, having
a distinct sense of ‘the individual character of something as manifested to observation.’”9 In
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other words, Nestorius used prosopon to refer to the reality of Christ, both in nature and in
physical manifestation. Nestorius believed using this term would maintain the unity of Christ
while also allowing distinction in natures. So, Nestorius argued that Christ had two prosopa, one
divine originating from the Logos and one human originating from the fleshly Incarnation.10
Nestorius observed these prosopa in the way that Scripture presented Christ. In certain
passages, Scripture witnesses Christ exercising human properties, such as becoming tired or
hungry, and Nestorius attributed these behaviors to Christ’s human prosopon. While in other
Scriptures Christ gives evidence of divine prosopon through omniscience and performing
miracles. In fact, it was common for Nestorius to demonstrate this distinction by talking about
“the man Jesus” and “the divine Logos,” a seemingly blatant separation of the divine and human
natures. At this, his accusers were adamant that he was professing the heretical “Two Sons”
Christology, but Nestorius had his own way of describing the union of the natures in Christ:
In one Christ two natures without confusion … that there is of the divinity and of the
humanity one Christ and one Lord and one Son … there both exists and is named one
Christ, the two of them [i.e., the natures] being united, he who was born of the Father in
the divinity, and of the holy virgin in the humanity, for there was a union of the two
natures.11
In another effort to avoid “mixture” language Nestorius preferred the term conjunction
(synapheia) to Cyril’s hypostatic union. The two natures in Jesus, divine and human, were
intimately joined without confusion in the person Jesus Christ.
The distinction in natures described by conjunction was problematic, in that it suggests
two persons (prosopa) rather than one. To solve this conundrum, Nestorius appealed to the
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observable reality of the Incarnation as the unity of Christ, in a theory which is called “Prosopic
Reality” by McGuckin (and others). He provides a succinct description of the Nestorian position:
The eyes of faith recognise in Christ two clearly observed aspects of his reality, which
signify to the beholder divinity as well as humanity. Christ, therefore, has two prosopa.
At the same time the eyes of faith recognise that this Christ who has two prosopa is not
the same as those prosopa themselves… Christ is not only a word for the union of these
two prosopic realities, it is also the concrete experience, in some way, of how that union
has taken place, how it is to be conceived, and how it ought to be articulated by the
church….In light of this it is not enough merely to insist that there are two prosopa in
Christ, because the experience of the unique revelation of Christ calls for the confession
that these is also the ‘prosopon of union’ the one Christ who manifests in a single
prosopon (observable reality)...12
Nestorius clearly saw in Scripture two distinct natures, divine and human, which were
manifested as a singular prosopon in Christ. Therefore, it was ridiculous to Nestorius that his
accusers should find two sons in his description, because the apostles and others who witnessed
Jesus clearly observed a single person, not two.13
However, not all scholars are convinced that Nestorius was arguing for a union of
prosopa, but that Nestorius argued (in his Bazaar after his exile) for a union of ousia in the one
prosopon of Christ. For instance, Anastos writes, “So, when he says that God the Word became
man, he means that the manhood of Jesus formed a distinct usia [ousia] alongside the usia
[ousia] of God, and that the two were joined together in the prosopon.”14 Thus Nestorius
describes the human and divine prosopa in the Incarnate Word as the concrete manifestation of
their ousiai, or foundational essence. This union as described by Nestorius in his Bazaar is
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different than “Two Sons” allegations from his enemies, because the divine and human natures
would have been united metaphysically and manifested as one physically.
For Nestorius the union of Christ’s natures was a ‘conjunction by interrelation’ (schetike
synapheia) of the two prosopa. The Divine Logos intimately bound himself to the human Jesus
without corrupting or negating the limited human nature with the omni-attributes of the divine
nature. Nestorius believed that the two natures were unequal, the divine being infinitely stronger,
and thus the only way for both to exist in the single prosopon (Christ) was through “a meeting of
loving wills that unite at the highest commitment of each capacity, a meeting that is made
possible and initiated by the condescension in love from the part of God.”15 In this description,
each prosopon had its own hypostasis, and the two were intimately joined by self-giving love.
While two wills seem to imply “Two Sons” Nestorius was more concerned with the end product
than their sources. While two wills came together, and yet maintained some metaphysical
distinction, Nestorius still considered there to be one person in the Incarnation: Jesus Christ, who
exhibited both human and divine natures. Nestorius would not allow a union which created “Two
Sons” or a confusing mixture of the human and divine. Thus, two factors stand behind Nestorius
understanding of the union: first, the incarnation could in no way cause the Logos to experience
change or passion, and second, in order for humanity’s redemption to be effective, Christ had to
live a “genuinely human life.”16
However, modern scholars who oppose Nestorius claim the weakness of his description
is that he uses prosopon to describe both the natures (physis) and the physical manifestation
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(prosopon) of Christ.17 Both Keating and McGuckin claim that Nestorius’ prosopic union failed
to attribute the eternal Logos as the real subject of Christ, or in other words that Christ is the
Logos in human nature. Recalling his primary metaphor of Christ as temple and the Logos as the
“one who dwells,” this critique is substantial. But scholars who hope to redeem Nestorius see
otherwise. Anastos argues (following Loofs and others) that Nestorius uses prosopon in two
different senses.18 The usage of Sense A was “the exterior aspect or appearance of a thing,”
while Sense B was closer to the modern understanding of “person,” and Nestorius used the term
in this way “as the designation for Jesus Christ, ‘the common prosopon of the two natures.’”19 In
this sense Nestorius may have not been arguing for a union of two prosopa, but that the prosopa
of Jesus Christ was the prosopa of the divine Logos. Consider Nestorius’ description of the
union from his Bazaar:
It is by person [prosopon] that He (the Son) is distinguished (from the Father). But it is
not so in regard to the union of the Godhead and the manhood. He is not by the union in
all those things the person by its nature is, so that in the one person He should become
another ousia. For He took man’s person, not the ousia or the nature, so that it should be
either homoousios with the Father or else another Son altogether and not the same Son.
For the manhood is the person of the Godhead, and the Godhead is the person of the
manhood: but they (the manhood and the Godhead) are distinct in nature and distinct in
the union.20
Notice that Nestorius was concerned that a union of natures would cause the human nature to
become indistinguishable from the nature of the Godhead, so instead Nestorius described the
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union in terms to the prosopon. Anastos interprets Nestorius as arguing for the human and divine
prosopa (Sense A) being united but not identical with the two natures, and that the union of the
two natures (which he called ousia) manifested itself in the one prosopa (Sense B) of Jesus
Christ.21
Whether Nestorius wanted the union to happen at the prosopic level or at the natural
level, his description caused his own terminological problems. Regardless of this confusion, it is
clearer now that Nestorius may not have meant to teach “Two Sons,” nor did he see his
description as a failure to adequately unite the Logos and the man Jesus. However, Cyril took a
different approach and had the union occur at the hypostatic level. While Nestorius considered
this to be problematic, due to the unequal status of the natures, Cyril required a union at this
level, as will be seen in his description.
The Christology of Cyril
What Nestorius saw in the term theotokos as inaccurate and crude, Cyril saw as a
description of the great truth realized in the mystery of the Incarnation, the self-emptying of the
Logos.22 It was primarily a declaration of Jesus Christ as God, in opposition to an understanding
of Christ as anything less than the full representation of deity. Theotokos was also a proclamation
of the humanity of Jesus as Cyril links the term to “the Word became flesh, and dwelt among
us,” (John 1:14) a concept which Cyril exhausts in his description of the person and nature of
Christ. For Cyril, it was a beautiful term which encapsulated the Incarnation by presenting the
divine and human natures of Christ.
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Cyril wrote his Commentary on John before the outbreak of the Nestorian controversy,
but the Fourth Gospel clearly had a profound impact on Cyril’s christology, forming the roots of
his understanding of the Incarnation. Cyril approached this Christological controversy from a
soteriological standpoint, namely, the doctrine of theosis (divinization).23 In this respect it was
vital that the Word “became” flesh, to experience the fullness of humanity. Christ did not assume
or embody flesh but became flesh in nature. Likewise, the Word “dwelt among us,” meaning that
he did not abandon his divine nature. Cyril writes,
Observe how they say that God is in him, without separating the Word from the flesh.
Moreover, they maintain that there is no God besides him, uniting with the Word that
which he wore, as his own particular property, that is to say, the temple he took from the
Virgin. For Christ is one from both.24
Thus the “dwelling” of the Word in the flesh is what prevents the confusion of natures, while the
“becoming” of flesh demonstrates the unity of natures. The phrase “Christ is one from both”
demonstrates his unity, but Cyril refrains from using that construction later in the controversy
with Nestorius due to its problematic nature.25
Cyril disclosed his understanding of the Incarnate Word in his first book of Against
Nestorius to argue in favor of theotokos, which he does using three primary arguments. The first
relates to Cyril’s understanding of human birth as a prerequisite for becoming flesh. He writes,
“Tell me, then, how could he have become flesh, if he had not received birth from a woman,
since the laws of human existence demand this and corporeal existence could not have been
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initiated in any other way?”26 In other words, true human existence necessitates true corporeal
birth. So, for the Word to become flesh Jesus had to experience human birth. The second
argument relates to Christ’s ability to transform. According to Cyril, “If he had not been born
like us according to the flesh, if he had not partaken of the same elements as we do, he would not
have delivered human nature from the fault we incurred in Adam, nor would he have warded off
the decay from our bodies, nor would he have brought to an end the power of the curse which we
say came upon the first.”27 It was necessary that the Word become true flesh, for if he did not
then he would have lacked the ability to redeem human flesh from the curse. Cyril adopted the
famous saying of Gregory Nazianzen, “What he [the Logos] has not assumed, he has not
healed.”28 Thus Cyril also required that the flesh be assumed to be redeemed. This led to Cyril’s
final conclusion, “Christ is truly God, the one and only Son of God the Father, not divided
separately as man and similarly as God, but the same existing both as Word from God the Father
and as human being from a woman, who is like is while at the same time remaining God.”29
Christ is by nature both the Word of God and a human man, not divide but existing as one. And
the Word is the same as God the Father. Thus, if Christ is God, and if Christ truly became flesh,
and if to become flesh means experiencing the corporeal birth of a woman, then Mary was in this
sense theotokos.
This final movement in his efforts to defend the theotokos title required further
explanation, which Cyril provides both in his Letters to Nestorius and his less circulated work
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Against Nestorius. Since much of Cyril’s explanation of the hypostatic union of Christ’s natures
is developed in response to Nestorius, his christology will also be described and compared
against Nestorius. The greatest critique Cyril made on Nestorius was that his description divided
Christ into “Two Sons,” which was soteriologically problematic, in that Christ could not be two
persons metaphysically and Christ had to both human and divine to redeem humanity.
A major contribution of Cyril to christology was how he explained the union divine and
human natures in the Incarnation. It would be helpful to introduce Cyril’s christology by
following the methodology of John McGuckin, of “what,” “why,” and “how,” which form the
three major threads of Cyril’s Christology.30 The “what” of his Christology is the singleness of
person and the fullness of both humanity and divinity. This was crucial to Cyril, because he saw
any division of person or nature of Christ to have drastic soteriological consequences, which
leads to the “why” of his Christology. Cyril regarded the Incarnation as a “dynamic
soteriological event,” in which the unity of the natures facilitated the restoration of humanity
through the flesh of Christ. 31 Finally, the “how” becomes his metaphysical and theological
description of the union (henosis) of the natures (hypostases) of Christ, or the hypostatic union.
What follows is an attempt to give a systematic explanation of Cyril’s hypostatic union theory.
Much of Cyril’s description of the Word “becoming” flesh has been delineated above, but
one further observation must be made, regarding exactly how Cyril allowed for such an event.
Rather, it is important to describe what Cyril does not mean by “became flesh.” It was necessary
that Cyril make the distinction that the Word did not become human by “assumption,” which was
Apollinarist, in that God merely “put on” flesh, or by “association,” a word that the Antiochenes
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preferred which connoted a greater distinction in natures. Cyril considered both a failure to
convey the “power and intimacy of the ‘Union’ between divinity and humanity.”32 Instead Cyril
describes the Incarnation event as
the Word, in an ineffable and incomprehensible manner, ineffably united to himself flesh
animated with a rational soul, and thus became man and was called the Son of Man. This
was not effected only as a matter of will, of favour, or by the assumption of a single
prosopon. While the natures that were brought together into this true unity were different,
nonetheless there is One Christ and Son from out of both. This did not involve the
negation of different natures, rather that the Godhead and manhood by their ineffable and
indescribable consilience into unity achieved One Lord and Christ and Son for us.33
While Cyril maintains here a hint of the mystery of the union, his language strongly favors an
intimate union of natures which, as he will develop later, do not negate each other. In addition,
the result of this union is the single prosopon of Jesus Christ, yet through a stronger union that he
considered Nestorius could demonstrate.
Whereas Nestorius maintained a distinction of natures through conjunction of the two
prosopa, Cyril demanded a union at a more intimate level, the hypostases. The singular person of
the Incarnation was in fact the divine Logos who was united hypostatically with humanity. Cyril
frequently described the Incarnate Logos as “enfleshed” (sesarkomene), in that the Logos
“appropriates” (oikesis) human nature hypostatically with the result that the human nature
ontologically becomes the human nature of the Logos.34 Cyril described this divine-human
interaction as the “economy of salvation” which he thought answered both the “why” and the
“how” of the Incarnation. Cyril argued that the Logos, incarnate in Jesus Christ, was not “naked”
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(gymnos) of his divine attributes, but that they were “enfleshed” in human nature.35 This allows
for a transformation of human nature, in that the divine nature is enfleshed and experienced
through the fragility and passibility of humanity. Ultimately, Jesus is glorified in the flesh,
allowing all of humanity to be glorified. Thomas Keating regards Cyril’s “signal contribution” to
christology as “his insistence on the Word as the single subject in Christ.”36
A union at the hypostatic level was not illogical to Cyril, who provided several analogies
to support his logic. Even before the christological controversy with Nestorius, Cyril described
the union at the Incarnation in terms of a coal and fire in his Commentary on Isaiah.37 The coal
in Isaiah 6:6 was appropriated with fire, just as the human hypostasis was appropriated by the
Logos. A second analogy Cyril draws upon is a lily and its scent, which he used to demonstrate
how the incorporeal scent and the corporeal flower are distinct yet they are both called “lily.”38
However his most utilized analogy of the union of humanity and divinity was the union of body
and soul. While the body and soul are two dissimilar elements they are nonetheless unified in the
human being, an embodied soul.39 Everything a human did was an action of both the body and
soul, and likewise the human and divine natures “came together in a mysterious and
incomprehensible union without change or confusion,” as an indivisible union.40
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According to Cyril’s appropriation theory, not only did the human nature benefit from the
divine nature through appropriation, but the divine was “enhanced” by the humanity for the sake
of God’s philanthropic relationship with humanity. Cyril had to be careful not to corrupt the
immutability of God nor shame the divinity of God by saying that God was lacking something
without a human nature. Instead Cyril says that God “thought it good to be made man and in his
(sic) own person to reveal our nature honored in the dignities of the divinity.”41 Cyril saw the
Logos’ appropriation to humanity as paradoxically mysterious and the heart of his christological
argument, which opened him up to new possibilities of language that shocked Nestorius and the
Antiochenes. For Cyril it was perfectly logical to say that the Logos “suffered impassibly,” in
that it was not merely the divine Logos who suffered in his own nature but the Logos-enfleshedwithin-history who suffered. Cyril describes it in this way in his Second Letter to Nestorius:
So it is we say that he both suffered and rose again; not meaning that the Word of God
suffered in his own nature either the scourging, of the piercing of the nails, of the other
wounds, for the divinity is impassible because it is incorporeal. But in so far as that which
had become his own body suffered, the he himself is said to suffer these things for our
sake, because the Impassible One was in the suffering body. We understand his death in
the same manner.42
Here, the Logos truly experienced suffering and death because he truly became flesh, uniting
himself to human nature. Within this economy, the Logos was able to bring about salvation. To
divide these natures into two hypostases, as Cyril accused Nestorius of doing, was to destroy the
economy of salvation for all of humanity. Instead, Cyril claimed Nestorius taught that Jesus of

41

Ibid., 55.

42

Cyril, Second Letter to Nestorius, v.

41

Nazareth was merely a man to be worshipped alongside the Logos, which was to him was
dishonorable.43
The implication of Cyril’s union allowed him to push metaphysical limits in a way that
truly disturbed Nestorius and the Antiochenes. Cyril justified the language that the Logos
“suffered impassibly” through the communicatio idiomatum. For Cyril, the Logos only
experienced death insofar as it was his own flesh which experienced death. In other words, it was
not the human prosopa alone which experienced death, as he thought Nestorius taught, but it was
the Logos being hypostatically joined to humanity which experienced death (not the finality of
death in divine nature, but the enfleshed nature). In Christ, the human attributes of the man Jesus
could be applied to the divine Logos, and vice versa.
Thomas Weinandy considers communicatio idiomatum to be the “hermeneutical key for
unlocking Cyril’s christology,” using the Nicene Creed as his precedence. The Creed stated that
the same (homoousion) from the Father “became incarnate of the Virgin Mary.”44 For Cyril,
communicatio idiomatum accomplished two things. First, it assured the oneness of Christ by
making the Logos the single subject of the Incarnation, also allowing Cyril to say that “God
wept.” Second, it was the vehicle by which salvation occurred. The enfleshed Logos did not
suffer in his divinity, but “he does suffer in his humanity which he has appropriated as his own”
and, “by suffering in the flesh, the sufferings of the flesh are transfigured, and by dying in the
flesh the Godhead definitively conquers death.45 Cyril considered Christ’s flesh as “lifegiving”
(1 Cor. 15) and he explained it this way:
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We proclaim the death according to the flesh of the Only begotten Son of God, and
confess the return to life from the dead of Jesus Christ, and his ascension … and in this
way approach mystical blessings and are sanctified, becoming participants in the holy
flesh … We do not receive this as ordinary flesh, God forbid, or as flesh of a man
sanctified and conjoined [synapheia] to the Word in a unity of dignity … No, we receive
it as truly the lifegiving and very-flesh of the Word himself.46
This passage expresses the beauty that Cyril saw in the Incarnation; the victory over sin and
death by the Logos who willingly and fully became flesh, suffered, died, and was raised, so that
we could participate in his flesh (especially through the Eucharist).
Concluding Remarks
It is plain to see how the two theologians approached the Incarnation from quite different
perspectives. Much of the development of their christologies seems to be in reaction against the
other, while being guided by their own a priori assumptions. Though they found common ground
in their effort to depict Jesus Christ as both fully human and fully divine, their disparate
emphases on various aspects of the debate created a disconnect. Nestorius sought a description of
Christ that was clear, accurate, and rooted in a traditional understanding of the Incarnation. He
simply could not concede to Cyril’s seemingly brazen description of the Incarnation, especially
with what he considered to be a maltreatment of the distinction of natures through Cyril’s
communicatio idiomatum. Against Nestorius, Cyril desired a description of the Incarnation
which accentuated the mysterious and audacious nature of the event, and broke new
christological ground. He saw Nestorius’ trepidation to describe a true union as a failure which
had disastrous implications on the salvific role of Christ. While Cyril’s version of the Incarnation
won the day, the consequences on their confrontation created centuries of conflict and
misunderstanding.
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Scholars are left to wonder what would have happened if Cyril and Nestorius could have
reconciled their differences. Most believe that task is simply impossible, while others do the hard
work of reading Cyril and Nestorius with fresh eyes as they attempt to wade through centuries of
their interpretation. At the very least, both theologians have offered invaluable contributions to
christological studies, and an understanding of the Incarnation can be nuanced by both.
Additionally, the study of the divine and human uniting in Christ evokes a spirit of ecumenism,
which has encouraged others to reevaluate their work with the goal of reconciliation.
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Chapter Three
Towards a Reconciliation of the Henosis and Prosopic Christologies

This final chapter will summarize the major points at which Cyril and Nestorius agree
and disagree to examine the possibility of any reconciliation. While the scholarly landscape has
shifted in the past century of study concerning the christology of Nestorius—many scholars such
as Daniel Keating and John McGuckin recognize the nuanced position Nestorius held in light of
the discovery of his Bazaar, and no longer consider him to be “strictly Nestorian”—most
maintain that Cyril’s position demonstrates the longstanding orthodox description of the
Incarnation while Nestorius’ position falls short. Given the tension created by their writings,
scholars continue to conclude that their two positions are irreconcilable. However, some have
opened the door to new ways of reading Nestorius and Cyril with the goal of reconciling the
Nestorian description with Cyril’s “orthodox” description. While this study has demonstrated the
disparity of the two christologies, it will end with an attempt to demonstrate the orthodox nature
of the Nestorius’ description of the Incarnation, and in some harmony with Cyril.
It is worth mentioning that a complete reconciliation of the christologies of Cyril and
Nestorius is not possible; as this paper has demonstrated, their discrepancies are significant.
However, progress towards reconciliation can be made through the following efforts: 1) If
orthodox status1 can be given to Nestorius’ own christology; and 2) If clarity can be brought to
their discrepancies to demonstrate their similarities above their differences. If orthodoxy can be
viewed on a spectrum, Nestorius and Cyril represent the two boundaries of that spectrum—
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Nestorius representing the “Word-man” christology on one end, Cyril representing the “Wordflesh” christology on the others, and the Chalcedonian Definition representing the middle
ground.2
Disagreements
Before working towards reconciliation, their major disagreements and approaches must
be identified. The most noteworthy disagreements are: the starting point of the Incarnation, the
subject of the Incarnation, the union within the Incarnation (location), and the economy of that
union (nature of union). Cyril begins with the subject of the Divine Logos and moves towards
the Incarnation into a human being. In his writings Cyril often begins his description of the
Incarnation with one of his favorite texts, John 1:14, writing that “the Word substantially united
to himself flesh.”3 Cyril then works towards describing how the Word unites hypostatically with
the human nature without destroying, altering, or confusing the two. Because of this, the burden
on Cyril is to define the way in which the divine and human ousiai remain unconfused (distinct)
in the Incarnation.
In contrast, Nestorius worked from the other direction, beginning with the external
prosopon (observable reality) of Christ to the individual divine and human ousia.4 He recalled
that the Evangelists wrote of Christ in ways that demonstrated Christ’s divine power and human

2

The Chalcedonian Definition represents concession from both Alexandria and Antioch. It contains the
language of “Theotokos” but the most unifying line in the statement is: “One and the Same Christ, Son, Lord, Onlybegotten; acknowledged in Two Natures unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; the difference of the
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frailty, both in one prosopon. Thus, the burden on Nestorius was to demonstrate how the
Incarnation exhibited a true union. These burdens caused Cyril and Nestorius to react strongly
against one another; Nestorius claiming that Cyril confused the natures of Christ, and Cyril
claiming that Nestorius robbed Christ of a true union of divine and human.
Cyril’s insistence upon the Logos being the initiation of the Incarnation also contributed
to his belief that the Divine Logos was the single subject of the Incarnate Christ. Keating notes
that Cyril’s central point is that “Christ simply is the eternal Word now made flesh for our
sake.”5 Cyrilline scholars like Keating and McGuckin argue that it is this fundamental point
which caused an irreconcilable conflict between Cyril and Nestorius. Cyril challenged Nestorius
to consider that “a single subject christology means a dynamic and intimate union of different
conditions in the one life of God.”6 This sort of union was characterized by Cyril’s use of a
henosis of the divine and human hypostases. However, Cyril’s description poses its own
problems. Christ seems to have no human hypostasis, only the human nature within the Logos
which “hypostasized” it in human form.7 Thus Nestorius argued that this disgraceful confusion
actually weakened Jesus’ humanity.
While Nestorius agreed that the eternal Word was present in the union, the Logos was
“conjoined” (synapheia) to human nature, rather than “assumed” as Cyril described it. This led to
the “Two Sons” accusation, which has already been weakened. Instead, Nestorius was
attempting to describe a complete union which still maintained a distinctness of natures, while
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emphasizing a personal union of love which manifested itself in the prosopon of Jesus Christ.8
Clearly, Nestorius’ primary goal was to avoid any sort of union at the risk of the confusion of
natures, but what is not as clear to scholars is the locus divinitatis in Nestorius’ christology.
Cyril’s christology has been described as paradoxical and profoundly mystical, and
Nestorius’ christology could be described as practical and semantical. Cyril’s “hypostatic union”
into a single subject freed him to apply the communicatio idiomatum between human and divine
properties. For Cyril, the communication of attributes was the catalyst by which the Logos
conferred salvation upon humanity through divine appropriation and deification. Cyril’s
paradoxical way of describing the Incarnation accomplished both human salvation and a truly
intimate union. However, Nestorius found the concept of communicatio idiomatum theologically
sloppy and often repugnant.
Where Cyril saw a paradoxical communication, Nestorius saw distinct yet concomitant
expressions of two different natures, divine and human. To protect this distinction, Nestorius
claimed that “God the Logos raised the dead Lazarus, while the man Jesus wept at the tomb.”9 In
this way Nestorius is emphasizing the distinctness, but not to discredit their union, for one Christ
did both action. Thus Nestorius and Cyril approached the union and their economy in polar
opposites. By denying the communication of attributes, Cyril believed that Nestorius’ position
inevitably led to two divided Sons, and thus an incomplete union; Nestorius considered Cyril’s
position as characteristically Theopaschite, or that the Logos was passible and able to suffer in
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nature.10 Yet Nestorius’ description had its own shortcoming. His desire to separate the natures at
a fundamental level had difficult soteriological implications. Cyril considered this division an
affront to the very salvific mission of Christ.
Towards Reconciliation
While considerable effort has been made since the discovery of Nestorius’ Bazaar to
demonstrate that he was not “Nestorian,” nor was his position unorthodox, there have been fewer
attempts to reconcile his view with Cyril’s. Having established their presuppositions, clarified
their christologies, and summarized their major points of confliction, we are prepared to move
towards reconciling the two views. The premise of this attempt is that the views of Cyril and
Nestorius are not fundamentally opposed to one another—they both wanted the same thing—
however the conflicting metaphors, metaphysical terms, presuppositions, and overall heat of the
controversy caused their differences to be blown out of proportion.11 An attempt at reconciliation
is possible, and although Cyril and Nestorius never used quite the same language, they were both
trying to say similar things, coming at the Incarnation from opposite ends of orthodoxy. Thus, I
will examine the major points of contention described above while rectifying the two views.
First to be reconciled is their perspective of where to begin in describing the Incarnation,
either with the Word or with the observable person of the Incarnation. Their opposing starting
points betray their presuppositions and reactions against one another. Cyril’s primary text and
biblical imagery comes from John 1:14, in which the Logos “became” flesh. Cyril’s desire to
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begin with the Logos and move towards the Incarnation into human form indicates his desire that
the Logos fully assumes humanity, so that humanity might be fully restored. In turn, Nestorius
begins externally, moving from the prosopon of “the man Jesus” observed in Scripture to
describe the Incarnation. Based on the premise that the Incarnate Christ was one Person with two
conjoined natures, Nestorius indicated that both natures were manifest in the singular person of
Jesus Christ. Nestorius’ strategy came from both his literal exegetical method and his reaction
against the hypostatic union described by Cyril, which to Nestorius seemed to be a comingling of
natures. By moving from the external reality (prosopon) to the natures of Christ, Nestorius hoped
to demonstrate the distinction of the natures while also promoting their union. Ultimately the
origination of their views brought them to the same point of the Incarnation: the union of the
Logos and humanity, which is where the tension continued to build.
The question of the subject of the Incarnation concerns what Cyril meant with his
construction “mia physis [one nature] of the Incarnate Word.” Cyril uses this language to
describe the singularity of the Word in Incarnate form. Mark Edwards speaks to the Apollinarist
roots of this phrase, which had concerned the Antiochenes, as the divine nature of the Logos
seems to completely consume the human nature, leaving only one (divine) nature.12 And yet
Cyril clearly differentiated from the human and divine natures in the one subject of the Word
through his description of the hypostatic union. Keating notes that Cyril uses this formula to
express the single subject of the Incarnate Christ while distinguishing between the hypostasis of
the Word and the full human and divine natures which are united in the Word.13 Thus Cyril’s
description emphasizes the union within the subject of the Word, which assumes the fullness of
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humanity in order to restore it. From the other perspective, Nestorius and the Antiochenes sought
to emphasize the two different natures within the single prosopon of Christ. Nestorius writes,
“God the Logos was made man that He might therein make the humanity the likeness of God.”14
Clearly, Nestorius also claimed the Logos as the subject of the Incarnation; only his description
allowed for a union that differentiated between the divine and human natures without a mere
facsimile of a union. It is this conjoined union which allows Christ to be the moral mediator
(High Priest) who redeems humanity. While Cyril’s description emphasized a single subject of
the Logos which contained the fullness of humanity and divinity by means of their hypostatic
union, Nestorius described a conjoined subject (one from two) which was singular in their shared
prosopon. Here we see both theologians making the effort to demonstrate one Incarnate Word,
who possesses the fullness of human and divine natures, Cyril’s with a christology which affirms
the divine Logos, and Nestorius with a christology which affirms the presence of Christ’s
humanity.
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of their christologies to rectify, and thus requiring the
most attention, is the union of the Incarnation. Two major issues regarding the union of natures
require reconciliation: first concerning the location of the union, and second concerning the
economy (or nature) of the union. The terms hypostasis and prosopon are relevant regarding the
location of the union. Cyril proposed a union of natures in the hypostasis of Christ. A union in
the single hypostasis of Christ promoted Cyril’s desire for a single subject of the Logos in Christ
Jesus. McGuckin describes Cyril’s thought succinctly:
Cyril also applied [hypostasis] to denote the manner of the christological union: it was a
hypostatic union (henosis kath’ hypostasin), [sic] that is one that was based and founded
on the singleness of hypostasis [sic]. This means that, for Cyril the union of two distinct
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levels of reality, Godhead and manhood, takes place dynamically because there is only
one individual subject presiding over both, the one person of the incarnate deity.15
Thus, for Cyril, a hypostatic union accomplished two things: 1) a true union of two natures,
divine and human, in a single personal subject who is both at the same time; and 2) a real union
and concrete event, or substantive reality, not a theoretical union. It was this union which
prevented falling into “Two Sons” and affected the salvation of humanity through the
assumption of the flesh by the divine Word. Cyril also explained that full humanity and divinity
were present within the one hypostasis of the Incarnate Word, preserving the fullness of both
natures. In short, Cyril’s placement of the union at a deeper metaphysical reality demonstrated an
effort towards a true union through a single subject after the union.
The location of Nestorius’ union began from a more functional approach (as opposed to
metaphysical), based on what he saw in Scripture and his underlying assumptions about
metaphysics. Nestorius reacted against Cyril’s use of “hypostatic union” because he believed it
inevitably led to the confusion or intermingling of divine and human ousiai. He writes of Cyril,
“But this (kind of union) is corruptible and passible; but a union of natures into a person
[prosopon] is impassible and incorruptible; for it comes by free appropriation—for the union is
not involuntary—by condescension and exaltation, by authority and obedience.”16 For Nestorius
a union in the prosopon of Christ accomplished the distinction of natures necessary to preserve
the Logos as divine and the man as human. However, Nestorius also believed that a prosopon
without an ousia was unheard of, so his understanding of prosopon was not in mere appearance,
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but the representation of “a real element in the being of a thing.”17 This means that the prosopon
of each of the human and divine natures represented the fullness of each. He demonstrates this
by writing that “in Christ—all the [properties] of God the Word whose nature is impassible and
is immortal and eternal and all the [properties] of the humanity, which are a nature mortal and
passible and created, and those of the union of the incarnation . . . are referred to one prosopon,
to that common prosopon of our Lord Jesus Christ.”18 By locating the union in the prosopon of
Christ, Nestorius was attempting to articulate a union that maintained the distinction of natures,
while representing a true union through the singular person of Christ (both physical/external and
metaphysical in personhood). One could argue whether Cyril and Nestorius were attempting to
describe the same metaphysical concept while using two different metaphysical terms, both
misunderstanding the other.19
Now, we consider how Cyril and Nestorius viewed the economy of the union through the
terms henosis and synapheia respectively, as well as the metaphors each used. For Cyril, henosis
was the only term to describe a full and proper union in the Incarnation. To describe this union,
Cyril most commonly used the metaphor of the union of the body and soul in a person. He states
that while both share a distinctness (the souls is, by nature, not the body, and vice versa) when
the soul is united to the body it creates a new condition, a “single reality by means of their
dynamic interpenetration.”20 Cyril believed this analogy demonstrated his christological
principle: a union of two things discrete in regards to their respective natures could create a new
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condition wherein the two were united and yet their union did not destroy the integrity of their
original natures. Any action performed by Christ was both divine and human, as the Logos was
the single subject of the enfleshed person. While Nestorius accused such a description as being a
mixing or co-mingling, Cyril expanded christological thought beyond the mixis concept of his
Alexandrine forefathers, Athanasius and Origen, through his henosis theory of hypostatic union.
To avoid Cyril’s mixture language, Nestorius used the word synapheia to describe the
union of divine and human. He preferred language and metaphors which expressed an intimate
indwelling, which he identified in Scripture. He likened the Logos to the High Priest who dwells
within the Temple (human). In one of his surviving sermons he writes, “While we keep distinct
the properties of the natures, let us conjoin the dignity of the union. Let us not say that God the
Word is the temple, but rather its inhabitant; let us not imagine that the temple is He who
inhabits it, but rather that which is inhabited.”21 Here, and through his exegesis of the Gospels,
Nestorius differentiates between the two natures, while uniting them in the Temple, not too
dissimilar from Cyril’s soul-body metaphor. Nestorius felt comfortable attributing some acts as
emanating from Christ’s divine nature, and some from his human nature, because they were the
acts of one Christ and Lord, not two, and both natures were exercised within one united person.
McGuckin notes that Nestorius’ union by synapheia was based on mutual love, rather than the
necessities of nature.22
How can there be movement towards reconciliation in both the location and the economy
of the union described by Cyril and Nestorius? By examining the weakness of each and
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recognizing the commonality of their pursuit, we can begin to see that there is some hope for
reconciliation. Regarding both the location and economy of the union, clearly Cyril produces
stronger language by placing the union within the hypostasis and through his usage of henosis to
describe the union. The intimacy he saw between the two natures in Christ was epitomized in the
communicatio idiomatum. However, as Nestorius demonstrated in his critique of Cyril, this
description often led to what seemed to be a confusion of natures (to the point of corruption) and
to himself being accused as a theopaschite. A danger of Cyril’s description of the union was that
such an intimate union of “from two [natures], [to] one” seems to imply that after the union only
one nature seems to exist, and that the divine nature negates or destroys the human nature.23
Nestorius used weaker union language to preserve the distinction of the natures, and his
effort bore witness to the holiness of God. While Nestorius taught that Christ was one, he
attributed the divine acts of Christ to his divine nature, and human acts to his human nature. This
caused Cyril to question the legitimacy of Nestorius’ description of a true union. His position
exhibited its own dangers: if the nature of the Word performs the miracles, and the nature of the
human performs that which is human, then one nature is constantly overpowering the other. The
two natures seem to co-exist inside one person, rather than being united.24 However, the
weaknesses of both theologians can be strengthened by the position of the other: Cyril’s position
could have been better balanced by the terminological accuracy of Nestorius, and a willingness
to audaciously embrace the mystery of the union could have also strengthened Nestorius’
position.
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Two points of agreement bring both theologians towards reconciliation. The first is that
they both sought to describe a true and genuine union. While scholars still disagree if either
accomplished such a description, it has been clearly demonstrated that each intended to do so.
Cyril’s union accentuates the audacious and radical nature of this union, by describing a union
through assumption, or the Logos “becoming” flesh. His position is succinctly described by this
statement: “We say, rather, that the Word, in an ineffable and incomprehensible manner,
ineffably united to himself flesh animated with a rational soul, and thus became man and was
called the Son of Man.” 25 In another way, Nestorius describe a true union of love, volition, and
obedience. His position is that: “[Christ] is the subject of the two natures which are separated in
essence, but united by love, and in one and the same prosopon.”26 Both desired a genuine union
and describe it in ways allowed by their presuppositional boundaries. Cyril’s approach describes
an intimate union of natures, while Nestorius describes the union through a beautiful
understanding of love and obedient self-limitation.
Secondly, both desired to describe a union which still maintained a true distinction of
natures such that neither was corrupted or altered at their most fundamental level. In this respect
Nestorius showed the most care in his position. In one instance he writes, “I praise the distinction
of natures according to the definition of humanity and divinity, and the conjunction of them into
one person, and not saying that God the Word had need of a second begetting from a woman,
and the profession that the divinity does not admit of suffering.”27 Nestorius believed that a true
union could still be accomplished while maintaining a true distinction of the natures, which he
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described through his use of synapheia to describe a union-yet-distinction concept. Cyril found
agreement in the need to maintain true distinction, to avoid the heretical language of Apollinaris.
He believed his description did not confuse the natures. He wrote, “While the natures that were
brought together into this very true unity were different, nonetheless there is One Christ and Son
from out of both. This did not involve the negation of the difference of natures.”28 Cyril
expressed this distinction through his avoidance of mixis language and by maintaining a
distinction within the hypostasis of Christ. Clearly, both believed their description of the union
maintained an appropriate distinction in natures, and both exhibit considerable effort to illustrate
a true union of distinct natures.
Complete reconciliation of their two views is, most likely, impossible. This has been
demonstrated in numerous ways, rooted in their presuppositions, their exegetical methods and
biblical metaphors, and their language to describe the Incarnation. However, it is evident that
genuine efforts can be made towards reconciling the two views and their constituents, by
centering the conversation around the question of orthodoxy. If Cyril and Nestorius represent the
“edges of orthodoxy” concerning the Incarnation of the Word, then each can maintain their
distinction while being reconciled in their common goal of an orthodox description of the
Incarnation. Nestorius represents the conservative and technically precise edge, which preserves
the distinctness of the natures and describes a union of love and obedience. Cyril represents the
progressive and mystical edge, which develops a moral union of human and divine natures
seeking the restoration of humanity. Each position should be considered the boundaries of
orthodoxy, with the Formula of Reunion (433) and the Chalcedonian Definition (451) forming
the middle ground. While the two theologians describe the Incarnation in different ways, both

28

Cyril, Second Letter, 3, quoted in McGuckin, The Christological Controversy, 263.

57

should be considered orthodox descriptions, and thus the form these “edges,” safeguarding our
understanding of the Incarnation in the tradition of the Church. From this perspective, the
legacies of Cyril and Nestorius can rest, not in controversy and scandal, but as champions of the
edges of an orthodox description of the Incarnation.
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Conclusion

Is reconciliation between Cyril and Nestorius possible? The goal of this prolegomenon
has been to set the foundation for further study to continue the work of reconciliation. The
conclusion of this thesis is that while Cyril and Nestorius may have not ever been able to agree
fully, the two should still be considered orthodox on their own terms. History eventually began
to lean towards their reconciliation, found in both the Formula of Reunion and at the next major
Council of Chalcedon. The heart of the Formula reads:
We confess, then, our lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God perfect God and
perfect man of a rational soul and a body, begotten before all ages from the Father in his
godhead, the same in the last days, for us and for our salvation, born of Mary the virgin,
according to his humanity, one and the same consubstantial with the Father in godhead
and consubstantial with us in humanity, for a union of two natures took place. Therefore
we confess one Christ, one Son, one Lord. According to this understanding of the
unconfused union, we confess the holy virgin to be the mother of God because God the
Word took flesh and became man and from his very conception united to himself the
temple he took from her.1
One can notice elements of both Cyril and Nestorius in the passage above. For Cyril, it
incorporates the theotokos title while also working in strong union language. For Nestorius, it
maintains an effort to avoid confusion the natures in the union, while also drawing on his Temple
metaphor to describe the union. Theologians would, for the next 1,500 years, continue to debate
and critique the positions offered by Nestorius and Cyril, opening doors to more nuanced
understandings of each.
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When Nestorius was defeated he was banished, and his writings burned. When Cyril
died, one of his Antiochene rivals wrote, “At last with a final struggle the villain is dead.”2 The
christological conflict which ended in such animosity has since seen centuries of healing. The
scope of this study was limited to the christologies of Cyril and Nestorius, factors influencing
their presuppositions, and their disagreements and points of agreement. The goal throughout has
been to study their christologies to determine whether reconciliation might be possible or
worthwhile. However, this study has only scratched the surface, and it would profit from more
study of the political, ecclesial, and social factors which contributed to the thought-divide
between the two theologians. Further study is needed in a few areas. Most helpful would be
greater access to English translations of their texts, which requires ongoing translation work.
Secondly, a comparative analysis demonstrating direct quotes from Cyril and Nestorius,
containing points of contrast and agreement, would shed more light on the effort of
reconciliation. Finally, scholars must continue to work of peeling back the layers of political
rivalries to expose the barebones of each christology. Doing so has already brought success in at
least a “partial” restoration of Nestorius, which can lead to greater unity.
One could ask the next question: Do Cyril and Nestorius need to be reconciled? I would
argue that it is a worthwhile effort, because rejecting one side over the other creates an
incomplete portrait of the person of Christ, and because even the various traditions of the Church
have come to different “answers” to the problem of Incarnation. Continued study of Cyril and
Nestorius, and how they have been misunderstood, can lead to greater ecclesial reconciliation as
well. R.V. Sellers offers two more reasons that reconciliation is both possible and valuable. First,
he argues that “though [Alexandria and Antioch] approach these subjects from different angles,
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they see the vital connection between the doctrine of Christ’s Person and that of His redemptive
work, and establish their Christology upon definite soteriological principles.”3 Thus, the
reconciliation of this doctrine also contributes to soteriological questions. Secondly, and most
important for this study, he concludes that the christologies of Cyril and Nestorius, while being
different, are necessary because “one is the complement of the other.”4
There is something to appreciate in both of christologies. Cyril fought to uphold the
mysteriously paradoxical union of God and humanity, in a way in which the Logos empties
himself so that humanity may be filled with the divine presence of God. His “hypostatic union”
which allowed for the communication of properties was groundbreaking work, both
christologically and soteriologically. Likewise, Nestorius was careful to preserve God as
transcendent and “Other,” and yet Who chose to become emptied, and joined in a union of love
and obedience to redeem humanity. When seen together—rather than in opposition—the two
provide a fuller glimpse into the person of Jesus Christ.
After the Formula of Reunion was published, Cyril wrote these words to John of Antioch,
who had been a friend and advocate of Nestorius during his deposition. This excerpt serves as a
fitting end to this work:
“Let the heavens rejoice and the earth be glad” (Ps. 95:11; Eph. 2:14) for the
dividing wall of partition is broken down, and sorrow has ended, and the cause of
all dissension has been removed. Christ the Saviour of us all has granted to his
churches the prize of peace… For we held in mind what the Saviour said: “My
peace I give to you; my peace I leave with you” (Jn. 14:27). And we were always
taught to say in our prayers: “O Lord our God, give us peace, for you have given
us all things” (Is. 26:12). So, if anyone participates in the peace that God
provides, he will be lacking in no good.5
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